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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS is the tenth consecutive year that this Survey article has
sought to provide practitioners with a clear understanding of the
latest judicial developments related to the practice of corporate
law in Texas.' In each of the Corporations Surveys published during the
last decade, our goal has been to promote "certainty and predictability"
in Texas corporate law.2 Through this Survey article, we hope to do the
same.
* Glenn D. West is a partner in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal, &
Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas.
** Stacie L. Cargill is a future associate in the Corporate Department of Weil, Got-
shal & Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas. The authors express appreciation to Michelle Hart-
mann, an associate in the Litigation Group of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, for her
helpful editorial assistance. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the au-
thors, and are not necessarily shared or endorsed by Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, or its
partners.
1. See generally Glenn D. West & W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Corporations, 61 SMU L.
REV. 743 (2008); Glenn D. West & Emmanuel U. Obi, Corporations, 60 SMU L. REV. 885
(2007); Glenn D. West & Benton B. Bodamer, Corporations, 59 SMU L. REV. 1143 (2006);
Glenn D. West & Sarah E. Stansy, Corporations, 58 SMU L. REV. 719 (2005); Glenn D.
West & Adam D. Nelson, Corporations, 57 SMU L. REV. 799 (2004); Glenn D. West &
Susan Y. Chao, Corporations, 56 SMU L. REV. 1395 (2003); Glenn D. West & Brandy L.
Treadway, Corporations, 55 SMU L. REV. 803 (2002); Glenn D. West, Corporations, 54
SMU L. REV. 1221 (2001), Glenn D. West & Christopher M. Fairman, Corporations, 53
SMU L. REV. 773 (2000).
2. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 514
(2001) (citing Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 220 (Del. Ch. 1974) ("It is obviously im-
portant that the Delaware corporate law have stability and predictability.")).
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"Prediction" is the business in which we actually are engaged as corpo-
rate lawyers; i.e., in providing our clients advice, we are effectively pre-
dicting how a court might decide a particular set of facts facing our clients
should our clients be required to defend their actions or enforce their
rights.3 And, to the extent that Texas corporate lawyers "cannot confi-
dently advise" their clients as to the liability-limiting effect of the corpo-
rate form or the enforceability of the liability-limiting contract provisions
entered into by corporations in Texas, corporate lawyers cannot effec-
tively do their job and "the effectiveness of [the] law [as a tool to regulate
society's behavior] is seriously diminished. . .. -4 As a result, our prior
Corporations Surveys have typically focused on the reliability in Texas of:
(i) the corporate form to protect corporate shareholders and affiliates
from the obligations and liabilities created by that corporation, and (ii)
contractual liability-limiting provisions aimed at protecting the expecta-
tions of corporate counterparties (and their officers, shareholders, and
affiliates), particularly from obligations imposed by tort law. While these
appear to be unrelated topics (one is a statutory protection and the other
is a contractual one), they are actually two sides of the same liability-
limiting coin with respect to which all corporate lawyers should be con-
cerned.5 After all, liability limitation is one of the primary purposes for
the formation of the corporation in the first instance. 6
The equitable doctrines7 underlying the theories upon which courts
premise their corporate disregard have been frequently criticized as being
"characterized by ambiguity, unpredictability, and even a seeming degree
of randomness."8 Texas courts have been particularly prone to this
3. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457
(1897).
4. See Perre v. Apand Pty Ltd. (1999) 198 C.L.R. 180, 215 (Austl.) ("the effectiveness
of law ... is seriously diminished when legal practitioners believe they cannot confidently
advise what the law is .... ").
5. And, a case decided during this Survey period shows how the two sides of this
liability-limiting coin can intersect and, at least as to that case, lead to unfortunate results.
See generally Dick's Last Resort of the West End, Inc. v. Market/Ross, Ltd., 273 S.W.3d
905 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. filed) (discussed infra notes 52-92). Legal theorists have
also noted that the liability limitation regime statutorily created to benefit the corporate
form is actually just a built-in default rule of a larger "contract" between society and the
corporation. See e.g., J. William Callison, Rationalizing Limited Liability and Veil Piercing,
58 Bus. LAW. 1063, 1065 (2003); Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 484-86.
6. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension
Between Form and Substance, 60 Bus. LAW. 109, 111-12 (2004); Douglas C. Michael, To
Know A Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41, 55 (2000); James Gerard Gaspard, II, A Texas Guide To
Piercing and Preserving the Corporate Veil, 31 BULL. Bus. L. SEC. ST. B. TEX. 24, 25 (1994);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1985).
7. There is a debate as to whether corporate avoidance doctrines are equitable theo-
ries or common law theories. See e.g., Michael, supra note 6, at 56; WM. Passalacqua
Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 135-37 (2d Cir. 1991). As con-
firmed by the declaration of the Texas Supreme Court, the authors believe these doctrines
have been applied in a clearly equitable manner. See Castelberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d
270, 273 (Tex. 1986) ("disregarding the corporate form is an equitable doctrine") (emphasis
added).
8. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 507.
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charge in the past.9 Indeed, in past Surveys, we have criticized the seem-
ing eagerness of some Texas courts to "do justice"10 by adopting vague
theories that fail to provide clear guidance to the Texas practitioner as to
the behavior our clients should avoid in order to maintain the sanctity of
the corporate form.1 1 With specific regard to advising clients on the in-
tended consequences to expect from carefully crafted contractual ar-
rangements negotiated at arms-length by sophisticated parties, we have
also questioned the willingness of some Texas courts to similarly "do jus-
tice" by judicially grafting tort law remedies where parties have expressly
contracted around and disclaimed any reliance on the same.1 2 While
there continued to be a few troubling decisions in these areas during this
Survey period, we are pleased to report that the Texas Supreme Court
produced two significant opinions that we believe address our prior criti-
cisms of many decisions of the Texas courts in these areas. We discuss
these decisions in Part II and Part III of this Survey article.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CORPORATE
FORM IN TEXAS
Texas courts have long recognized that a corporation is separate and
distinct from its shareholders. 13 It follows, then, that just as the assets of
a corporation belong to the corporation, not to the shareholders, 14 the
liabilities and obligations of a corporation are similarly those of the cor-
poration, not its shareholders.1 5 Indeed, there is absolutely nothing
9. See e.g., West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 755; West & Obi, supra note 1, at 896;
West & Nelson, supra note 1, at 817, 820 n.106; West & Chao, supra note 1, at 1416.
10. Michael, supra note 6, at 55.
11. See e.g., West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 753-54 (criticizing PHC-Minden v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163,175 (Tex. 2007) as creating trouble for practitioners
in identifying potential liability pitfalls for their clients); West & Obi, supra note 1, at 893
(criticizing the holding of Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 216 S.W.3d
436, 463 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied) as "[casting] doubt on the contin-
ued efficacy of the corporate shield in Texas .... ); West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1144
(noting the "bewildering array of 'veil piercing' theories with indeterminate elements" that
had developed in Texas courts); see also Michael, supra note 6, at 41-42 ("Indeterminate
standards wreak havoc on the life of the lawyer as counselor, a fact never mentioned in
court cases. Individuals set up corporations, frequently on the advice of counsel, with the
idea that they will face no personal liability for corporate obligations. What counsel does
not wince when telling her client that liability is limited except in certain unspecified and
unpredictable situations when it is not?").
12. West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 755-65; West & Obi, supra note 1, at 895-910.
13. See West, supra note 1, at 1221-22.
14. Aransas Pass Harbor Co. v. Manning, 94 Tex. 558, 563, 63 S.W. 627, 629 (1901).
See also William Meade Fletcher, The Nature of the Corporate Entity, 1 FLETCHER CYC.
CORP. § 31 (2008).
15. See e.g., Castelberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986) ("The corporate
form normally insulates shareholders, officers, and directors from liability for corporate
obligations .... "); Pabich v. Kellar, 71 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet.
denied) ("A corporation is a separate legal entity that normally insulates its owners or
shareholders from personal liability"); Aluminum Chems. (Bol.), Inc. v. Bechtel Corp., 28
S.W.3d 64, 67 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) ("[A] major purpose of the corporate
structure is to shield its shareholders from liabilities of the corporation."); Nat'l Hotel Co.
v. Motley, 123 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1938, writ dism'd judgm't cor.)
("[A]n individual whose business is authorized to be incorporated may incorporate such
2009] 1059
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wrong with forming a corporation specifically and intentionally for the
purposes of limiting liability for the actions and contracts of that corpora-
tion to the assets of that corporation alone. 16 As was noted almost eighty
years ago, "it is legitimate for a man or group of men to stake only a part
of their fortune on an enterprise. 17 The Fifth Circuit has similarly ac-
knowledged that:
[m]any wholly-owned subsidiaries and closely-held corporations are
not factually distinct from their owners. Many are in fact controlled
and operated in close concert with the interests of the owners, and
do not have a distinct factual existence .... Such conduct is per-
fectly natural and proper and provides no basis for ignoring legal
independence. 18
Nevertheless, as we have reported in past Corporations Surveys, cer-
tain Texas courts have, on occasion, ignored these principles and, in order
to prevent a perceived injustice, imposed corporate obligations and liabil-
ities on certain shareholders of the affected corporations. The willingness
of certain Texas courts to avoid the corporate form in order to correct a
perceived inequity reached its zenith in the Texas Supreme Court's 1986
decision in Castleberry v. Branscum.19 In Castleberry, the Texas Supreme
Court pierced the corporate veil by using an "alter ego" theory and un-
fortunately suggested that the corporate form could be avoided and
shareholders exposed to liability for a corporation's contractual obliga-
tions anytime "the separate corporate existence would bring about an in-
equitable result."'20
In response to the outcry of the Texas Bar to this expansive and unpre-
dictable basis of avoiding the corporate form, particularly in contractual
arrangements and any claims related thereto, the Texas Legislature
promptly adopted Article 2.21 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code
(Article 2.21).21 In Texas, a shareholder's personal liability for contractu-
business for the sole purpose of escaping individual liability of the owner for the debts of
the corporation.").
16. Sparks v. Booth, 232 S.W.3d 853, 868 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (stating
that it is a "bedrock principle of corporate law [in Texas] ... that an individual can incorpo-
rate a business and thereby ... shield himself from personal liability for the corporation's
contractual obligations.").
17. Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Robert Burnett, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Florida:
Defining Improper Conduct, 21 NOVA L. REV. 663, 665 (1997) (quoting William 0. Doug-
las & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39
YALE L. J. 193, 193-94 (1929)).
18. Gibralter Sav. v. LDBrinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1287 (5th Cir. 1988); see also
Mims v. Brunswick Homes, LLC (In re Moore), 379 B.R. 284, 289 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007)
(noting the "general principle, long imbedded in our corporate laws, that a parent corpora-
tion (or shareholder) is not liable for the acts of its subsidiary.").
19. See generally Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
20. Id. at 272-73; see also West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 745.
21. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21.A(2) (Vernon 2003). Note that for corpora-
tions formed on or after January 1, 2006, for corporations formed prior to January 1, 2006
that self-elect, and as of January 1, 2010, for all corporations, section 21.223-.225 of the
Texas Business Organizations Code (the "TBOC") replaces Article 21.21 as the controlling
law. Because the requirements of the TBOC are identical to those of Article 2.21, the
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ally related obligations of a Texas corporation is now governed by Article
2.21, which, following several amendments, now states that a shareholder
or affiliate of a corporation:
shall be under no obligation to the corporation or to its obligees with
respect to ... any contractual obligation of the corporation or any
matter relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that [the
shareholder or affiliate] is or was the alter ego of the corporation, or
on the basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to perpe-
trate a fraud, or other similar theory, unless the obligee demonstrates
that the [shareholder or affiliate] caused the corporation to be used
for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on
the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of [that share-
holder or affiliate]. '22
This statutory rule makes clear that, at least as to contractually related
liability, plaintiffs may no longer rely on the lower standard set forth in
Castleberry in order to avoid the corporate form. Rather, since the 1993
amendments, the sole method for piercing the corporate veil and impos-
ing contractually related liability on shareholders and affiliates is found in
Article 2.21. Further, to do so, Article 2.21 requires a showing that an
"actual fraud," rather than some lower threshold of wrongful conduct,
has been perpetrated through use of the corporate form for the direct
personal benefit of the corporation's shareholder or affiliate that is
sought to be charged with liability. Where Article 2.21 applies, it is "the
exclusive standard that must be met in order to pierce the corporate
veil. ' ' 23 So strong is the legislative pronouncement that courts have cau-
tioned against expanding liability under traditional veil piercing theories
even when Article 2.21 may not apply.24 Notwithstanding this strong legis-
lative commitment to the corporate form in Texas, in our 2006 Survey
article we cautioned that the corporate form in Texas remained in jeop-
ardy due to what we perceived to be the continued willingness of some
Texas courts to ignore or circumvent the plain reading of Article 2.21 and
to otherwise expand the theories of corporate avoidance in both contract
and tort cases, most notably through the "single business enterprise"
theory. 25
In that regard, in our last Survey article, we encouraged the Texas Su-
preme Court to clarify the legitimacy of the single business enterprise
doctrine in order to provide guidance to corporate planners seeking to
legitimately limit the liabilities of affiliated corporate entities.26 As set
forth below, that helpful guidance was provided during this Survey
period.
change does not effect the substance of the current law. See also Formosa Plastics Corp. v.
Kajima Int'l, Inc., 216 S.W.3d 436, 461 n.6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied).
22. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21.A(2) (emphasis added).
23. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21 cmt. at 176-78.
24. See e.g., In re Moore, 379 B.R. at 296.
25. West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1143.
26. Id. at 114; West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 753.
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A. THE GOOD NEWS: THE DEMISE OF THE
SINGLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
The single business enterprise doctrine, like other corporate avoidance
theories, is a mechanism used to "pierce the corporate veil" between af-
filiated corporations in order to hold one liable for the liabilities and obli-
gations of the other when businesses integrate resources. 27 In Texas, the
doctrine did not require any wrongful act or inequitable result to have
occurred through the use of the corporate form; rather, the Texas form of
the doctrine simply required that when businesses "integrate their re-
sources to achieve a common business purpose, each business may be
held liable for wrongful acts done in pursuit of that purpose. '28 In our
previous Survey articles we highlighted key Texas cases considering the
doctrine, as well as considerable disagreement among Texas appellate
courts regarding adoption of the same.2 9 The problem with the doctrine,
of course, is that most affiliated corporate groups in one way or another
"integrate their resources to achieve a common business purpose," i.e.,
making profits for the holding company parent to distribute to their
shareholders. And, there is nothing inherently wrong with limiting liabil-
ity through the formation of subsidiaries to pursue specific businesses
within the overall corporate group.30
By way of background, the doctrine first appeared on the Texas stage
in Paramount Petroleum Corporation v. Taylor Rental Center.31 Para-
mount was decided in 1986, the same year as Castleberry. While based on
a questionable legal and business foundation, the Paramount precedent
thereafter gained momentum and was used by numerous lower Texas
27. See PHC-Minden, L.P. v Kimberly-Clark Corp., 202 S.W.3d 193, 200-02 (Tex.
2007); Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co. v. Maltez, No. H-04-2222, 2007 WL 2908433, at *6-7
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2007); see also West & Lewis, supra, note 1, at 750-754; West & Obi,
supra note 1, at 891-93; West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1146-48.
28. Acad. of Skills & Knowledge, Inc. v. Charter Schs., USA, Inc., 260 S.W.3d 529, 538
(Tex. App.-Tyler 2008, no pet.) (also noting the differences between the single business
enterprise theory and the alter ego theory of piercing the corporate veil in that the alter
ego theory requires proof of fraud, but the single business enterprise theory does not).
29. See, e.g., PHC-Minden, 202 S.W.3d at 200-02 (applying the single business enter-
prise theory in a claim based on a violation of a duty of care); Formosa Plastics Corp., USA
v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 216 S.W.3d 436, 463 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied)
(holding that proof of actual fraud on contractor was not required to find that project
owner and subsidiary constituted a single business enterprise that could be held liable to
contractor for fraud arising from contracts, where project owner, and not subsidiary, signed
contracts, and jury found project owner guilty of its own fraud); Acceptance Indem. Ins.
Co., 2007 WL 2908433, at *6-7 (noting that the application of the single business enterprise
doctrine for indemnification issues is uncertain.). See also West & Lewis, supra note 1, at
750-754; West & Obi, supra note 1, at 891-93; West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1146-48.
30. See Sparks v. Booth, 232 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.); Gibralter
Sav. v. LDBrinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1287 (5th Cir. 1988).
31. 712 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stat-
ing "when corporations are not operated as separate entities but rather integrate their
resources to achieve a common business purpose, each constituent corporation may be
held liable for debts incurred in pursuit of that business purpose."); see SSP Partners v.
Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 452 (Tex. 2008).
1062 [Vol. 62
Corporations
courts to justify avoidance of the corporate form. 32
In 2003, the Texas Supreme Court made its first effort to contain the
spread of the single business enterprise doctrine. In Southern Union
Company v. City of Edinburg, the court held that liability under the sin-
gle business enterprise doctrine was inconsistent with Article 2.21. 33
However, in the wake of this decision, it remained unsettled whether the
single business enterprise doctrine could be used to pierce the corporate
veil in other contexts where Article 2.21 was not applicable.34 As evi-
dence of the confusion surrounding the applicability of the doctrine, in
2008, notwithstanding the Texas Supreme Court's unwillingness to de-
clare the doctrine unavailable in Texas in all contexts35 and the many
lower courts' willingness to embrace it outside of the Article 2.21 con-
text,36 the Tyler Court of Appeals explicitly held that the single business
enterprise doctrine was not recognized in Texas.37
Providing clarity to lower courts and practitioners, in SSP Partners v.
Gladstrong Investment (USA) Corporation,38 decided during this Survey
period, the Texas Supreme Court explicitly rejected the single business
enterprise doctrine as a recognized theory for piercing the corporate veil
in Texas on any basis.39 SSP Partners involved a products liability action
brought by the parents of a child killed in a house fire. The parents
claimed that the house fire was started by defective lighters sold by SSP,
but imported and distributed by Gladstrong USA. 40 Both SSP Partners
(SSP) and Gladstrong Investments (USA) Corporation (Gladstrong
32. See Robert W. Hamilton, Elizabeth S. Miller, & Robert A. Ragazzo, TEXAS PRAC-
TICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 26.22, at 422 (2d ed. 2004).
33. S. Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d 74, 87-90 (Tex. 2003).
34. Id. at 87 (stating that Article 2.21 controls in the context of liability for contractual
debts, but reserved its holding on the issue of whether the single business enterprise ap-
plied in other contexts). See West & Nelson, supra note 1, at 809 (discussing this case).
35. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d at 86-87 (noting that the Texas Supreme Court has
"never considered the 'single business enterprise' concept in any detail" and declining to
decide "whether a theory of 'single business enterprise' is a necessary addition to Texas law
regarding the theory of alter ego for disregarding corporate structure").
36. See e.g., Nat. Plan Admins, Inc. v. Nat. Health Ins. Co., 150 S.W.3d 718, 744 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2005), rev'd, 235 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. 2007); PHC Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly
Clark Corp., 202 S.W.3d 193, 200, 203 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005), rev'd, 235 S.W.3d 163 (Tex.
2007); Packard v. Guerra, 252 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet.
denied); Country Village Homes, Inc. v. Patterson, 236 S.W.3d 413, 434-35 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. judgm't w.r.m.).
37. Acad. of Skills & Knowledge, Inc. v. Charter Schs., USA, Inc., 260 S.W.3d 529, 539
(Tex. App.-Tyler 2008, no pet.). The Tyler court also noted the existence of a split in the
circuits on this issue by citing several decisions allowing the use of the doctrine. Id. (citing
SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 169 S.W.3d 27, 43 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2005), affd, 275 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2008); El Puerto de Liverpoos, S.A. de C.V. v.
Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. de C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622, 636 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002,
pet. dism'd w.o.j.); N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Emmons, 50 S.W.3d 103, 121 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2001, pet. denied)).
38. SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Inv. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2008).
39. SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 456. See also Nancy J. Brown, Texas High Court Re-
jects Single Business Enterprise Theory, Legal Backgrounder, Washington Legal Found.,
(Jan. 16, 2009) available at http://www.wlf.org/Publishing/results.asp?Search=Single+Busi-
ness+Enterprise&Year=&Topic=&Format=.
40. SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 447.
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USA) were named as defendants. SSP sought indemnity from Glad-
strong USA not based on a contract, but based, in part, upon the Texas
statute requiring manufacturers of defective products to indemnify the
seller of those products unless the seller itself caused the loss. 41 Glad-
strong USA moved for summary judgment on SSP's indemnity claim as-
serting that statutory indemnity was only required of "manufacturers"
and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code defines "manufacturer"
as "a designer, formulator, constructor, rebuilder, fabricator, producer,
compounder, processor, or assembler of any product. '42 Gladstrong
USA argued it was merely a distributor and, as such, not subject to the
statutory indemnity provisions. SSP responded by asserting, among other
things, that Gladstrong USA should be viewed as a manufacturer for the
purposes of statutory indemnity because it was a single business enter-
prise with the actual manufacturer, Gladstrong USA's parent company,
Gladstrong Hong Kong. According to SSP, therefore, Gladstrong USA
should be held liable for the debts of the manufacturer, Gladstrong Hong
Kong. The trial court granted Gladstrong USA's summary judgment mo-
tion, SSP appealed and the appellate court reversed the case in part and
remanded, noting that "one entity cannot be liable as part of a single
business enterprise if the other entities in the enterprise are not parties to
the case."'43
After exploring the shaky history of the single business enterprise doc-
trine, the Texas Supreme Court completely rejected the doctrine as a
valid corporate veil piercing mechanism in Texas.44 Specifically, the court
noted that:
[a]buse and injustice are not components of the single business en-
terprise theory stated in Paramount Petroleum. The theory applies
to corporations that engage in any sharing of names, offices, account-
ing, employees, services, and finances. There is nothing abusive or
unjust about any of these practices in the abstract. Different entities
may coordinate their activities without joint liability. 45
We have made this same point on many occasions in the past.46 Thus, we
applaud the Texas Supreme Court's long-overdue decision.
It is important to note that the Texas Supreme Court also used SSP
Partners as an opportunity to clarify its much criticized language from
Castleberry, wherein it held that the corporate veil could be disregarded
under traditional veil piercing theories whenever "recognizing the sepa-
rate corporate existence would bring about an inequitable result. ' 47 In
41. Id.; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.001(4) (Vernon 2005).
42. SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 447.
43. Id. at 449; see also SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 169 S.W.3d 27,
38 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.).
44. SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 456.
45. Id. at 454.
46. See West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 753-54; West & Obi, supra note 1, at 891-93;
West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1146-48.
47. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Tex. 1986).
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rejecting the single business enterprise doctrine in Texas, the supreme
court clarified that that the "inequitable result" concept described in Cas-
tleberry was not intended to:
mean a subjective perception of unfairness by an individual judge or
juror; rather, these words are used in Castleberry as shorthand refer-
ences for the kinds of abuse, specifically identified, that the corpo-
rate structure should not shield-fraud, evasion of existing
obligations, circumvention of statutes, monopolization, criminal con-
duct, and the like.48
It was in part because the single business enterprise theory was inconsis-
tent with the requirement that there be some actual abuse of the kind
described by the supreme court, that the supreme court held that the sin-
gle business enterprise theory "will not support the imposition of one cor-
poration's obligations on another. '49
While this is a welcome clarification of Castleberry and the application
of traditional corporate avoidance doctrines, like alter ego, it should have
no bearing on the requirements set forth in Article 2.21. In other words,
the laundry list of abuses that will justify an alter ego or other veil pierc-
ing claim when Article 2.21 is not applicable simply is irrelevant when
that statute is applicable, i.e., anytime a plaintiff seeks to impose upon a
corporation's shareholder or affiliate that corporation's contractual obli-
gations or "any matter relating to or arising from the obligation." To the
extent Article 2.21 is applicable, the use of the corporate form to perpetu-
ate an "actual fraud" for the personal benefit of the shareholder or affili-
ate sought to be charged with such obligations or liabilities must be
proved. Indeed, in reaching its decision in SSP Partners, the Texas Su-
preme Court was not relying upon Article 2.21 as a basis for its decision;
the supreme court had previously held in Southern Union that where Ar-
ticle 2.21 is applicable, the single business enterprise doctrine is one of
the many theories that is completely preempted by the exclusive provi-
sions of Article 2.21.50 But the supreme court did reference Article 2.21
in SSP Partners, declaring that "[t]he single business enterprise liability
theory is fundamentally inconsistent with the approach taken by the Leg-
islature in article 2.21."51 As will be seen in our discussion of Dicks Last
Resort in Part II B below, this reference to Article 2.21 in SSP Partners
may have been unfortunate.
48. SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 455.
49. Id. at 456.
50. S. Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d 74, 87 (Tex. 2003). Presumably the
reason the Texas Supreme Court did not rely upon Article 2.21 in SSP Partners is that
neither a statutory nor a common-law indemnity claim is a contractual obligation "or any
other matter related to or arising from" a contractual obligation.
51. SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 456.
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B. THE BAD NEWS: DiCK'S LAST RESORT GLOSSES
OVER ARTICLE 2.21
Dick's Last Resort of Texas, Inc. v. Market/Ross, Ltd.52 involved the
successful efforts of a landlord to impose liability for a defaulted lease
obligation upon non-party affiliates of the tenant corporation. In af-
firming the trial court's judgment in favor of the landlord against a vari-
ety of non-party affiliates of the actual corporate party tenant to the lease
agreement, the Dallas Court Appeals held that proof of the elements of
common law fraud was not required to prove "actual fraud" under Arti-
cle 2.21.53 Rather, seemingly relying upon the Texas Supreme Court's
clarification of Castleberry in SSP Partners, the court of appeals held that
all that was required to prove "actual fraud" under Article 2.21 was any
"conduct involving either dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive,"
whether or not the other elements of actual common law fraud are pre-
sent.54 While "dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive" is a fundamen-
tal requirement of "actual" fraud, as opposed to "constructive" fraud, all
six required elements of a cause of action for common law fraud in Texas
should not have been ignored, including "reasonable reliance" by the
"defrauded" party. 55 In superseding Castleberry's "inequitable conduct"
threshold through the enactment of Article 2.21, the Texas legislature ex-
pressly rejected Castleberry where contractually related liability is at is-
sue. Because the landlord only sought contractual damages under a lease
agreement, Article 2.21 clearly controlled, not Castleberry.5 6 As a result,
the authors believe this decision establishes potentially dangerous prece-
dent, however much the court may have wished to "do justice."
Market/Ross Ltd. ("Market/Ross") was the landlord, and Dick's Last
Resort of Dallas, Inc. ("Dick's Dallas") was the tenant of a lease agree-
ment for restaurant space. In 1999, the lease agreement was extended for
an additional term of ten years, ending on December 31, 2009. However,
as part of the negotiations for the lease extension Dick's Dallas bargained
to have Dick's Last Resort of West End, Inc. ("Dick's West End") be-
come the substitute tenant under the lease, completely removing Dick's
52. 273 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. filed).
53. Id. at 909.
54. Id.
55. Reasonable reliance is a required element of any fraud claim, whether "actual" or
"constructive." See West & Nelson, supra note 1, at 815; see also Saenz v. Martinez, No.
04-07-00339-CV, 2008 WL 4809217, at *7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Nov. 5, 2008, no pet.)
(requiring proof of reliance to establish constructive fraud); Avery Pharm. Invs., Inc. v.
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., No. 2-07-317-CV, 2009 WL 279334, at *10-12 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth Feb. 5, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reviewing the elements required for fraud by
nondisclosure, conspiracy to defraud, and misrepresentation in Texas).
56. We have previously noted, of course, that Article 2.21 applies not only to contrac-
tual obligations, but also to "any other matter related to or arising from" a corporate con-
tractual obligation. See, e.g., West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 746; West & Obi, supra note 1,
at 888; West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1149; West & Nelson, supra note 1, at 807; see
also Lincoln Gen Ins. Co. v. US Auto Ins. Serv., Inc., No. 3:07-CV-1985-B, 2009 WL
1174641, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2009).
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Dallas as a party responsible for the tenant's obligations.5 7 Indeed, in
Paragraph 7 of the lease amendment substituting Dicks' West End as the
tenant, the landlord agreed that it would "look solely to [the] New Tenant
[Dick's West End] for the performance of the Tenant's obligations here-
under. s5 8 The lease amendment also provided in Paragraph 13 that
"there are no written or oral inducements, promises, agreements, or con-
ditions made or offered in connection therewith that are not specifically
stated in writing."' 59 But, the case does not indicate that Market/Ross
asked for, or obtained, financial statements from, or any other evidence
of the creditworthiness of, Dick's West End.60
At the same time that Dick's West End became the tenant under the
lease, however, Dick's West End apparently sublet the premises back to
the successor by merger of Dick's Dallas, Dick's Last Resort of Texas, Inc
("Dick's Texas), without the landlord's knowledge or consent. The sub-
letting of the premises by Dick's West End to Dick's Texas apparently
was in violation of the lease amendment because the landlord's consent
was required for such subletting under the lease amendment, and a provi-
sion of the original lease required that the landlord be paid 1% of the
total gross sales from the restaurant in the event of any subletting or as-
signment of the lease. Dick's West End never paid the 1% of gross sales
to Market/Ross, and Market/Ross presumably did not know it was owed
the 1% because Dick's West End failed to inform them of, or obtain their
consent to, the subletting by Dick's West End to Dick's Texas. The sub-
lease between Dick's West End and Dick's Texas provided that Dick's
Texas could terminate the sublease at anytime upon 30-days prior written
notice to Dick's West End.61
In 2000, Dick's West End obtained a release of the landlord's lien from
Market/Ross on the furniture, fixtures, and equipment in the leased
premises; and in exchange for the release Market/Ross bargained for, and
obtained, a guaranty of Dick's West End's obligations under the lease for
up $45 million from another of Dick's West End's affiliates, Dick's Last
Resort of Chicago, Inc. ("Dick's Chicago"). Significantly, although Mar-
ket/Ross obviously knew how to demand and obtain the guaranty of
Dick's Chicago, they never demanded (or obtained) the guaranty of
Dick's Texas or any of the other non-party affiliates ultimately charged
with liability for Dick's West End's breach of the lease. 62 And, even in
obtaining the guaranty of Dick's Chicago, the case does not suggest that
57. Dick's Dallas became Dick's Texas by merger, thus Dick's Texas was the successor
to Dick's Dallas. See Appellants' Brief at 3, Dick's Last Resort, 273 S.W.3d 905 (Tex.
App.-Dallas Mar. 12, 2008, pet. filed).
58. Id. at 915.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 912. The thirty-day cancellation provision was apparently added to the sub-
lease specifically to permit Dick's Texas to cancel the sublease and avoid further liability
should a breach of the main lease between Market/Ross and Dick's West End occur. Id.
62. Id. at 908.
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Market/Ross sought any financial information concerning the ability of
Dick's Chicago to perform under its guaranty.
In 2005 (four years before the end of the lease term), the restaurant
was relocated, operations ceased on the leased premises, and Dick's West
End ceased paying rent.63 Market/Ross then sued Dick's West End for
breach of the lease and Dick's Chicago for breach of the guaranty. In
addition, based on both the single business enterprise doctrine and other
traditional theories of corporate veil piercing, Market/Ross alleged that
Dick's Texas, Dick's Holding Company, Inc. ("Dick's Holding Com-
pany"), and Steven Schiff ("Schiff"), the manager and partial owner of
Dick's Holding Company,64 were all responsible for the contractual dam-
ages arising from Dick's West End's breach of the lease. Following the
Texas Supreme Court's holding in SSP Partners, the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals rejected the finding of liability pursuant to the single business enter-
prise doctrine. However, the court ultimately upheld the corporate
avoidance holding pursuant to other veil piercing claims. 65
In making its veil piercing claims, Market/Ross pled no direct cause of
action against any of the non-party affiliates of Dick's West End, nor did
it specifically claim that it was fraudulently induced to enter into the lease
amendment substituting Dick's West End as the tenant.66 As the court
correctly noted, veil piercing claims "are not substantive causes of action;
rather they are means of imposing on an individual [or affiliated corpora-
tion] a corporation's liability for an underlying cause of action. '67 The
court thought this fact to be crucial; i.e, Market/Ross was simply seeking
"to impose the contractual liability of Dick's West End and Dick's Chi-
cago on Dick's Holding Company, Dick's Texas, and Schiff because they
allegedly used the contracting entities to perpetuate an actual fraud. ''68
Indeed, based on this distinction, the court dismissed as essentially irrele-
vant Market/Ross's disclaimers of reliance in Paragraphs 7 and 13 of the
lease amendment, suggesting that although these contractual provisions
may have defeated a direct claim for fraud against the non-party affiliates
of Dick's West End, they provided no protection from a veil piercing
claim.69 As set forth below, the authors believe that this conclusion, as
well as related conclusions that corporate avoidance under Article 2.21
does not in fact require a finding of each of the requisite elements of an
actual common law fraud or a showing of "direct personal benefit," was
63. Apparently Dick's Texas was actually paying rent directly to the landlord pursuant
to the sublease (not a particularly unusual fact). But the landlord apparently was unaware
of this fact.
64. Appellants' Brief at 23, Dick's Last Resort, 273 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. App.-Dallas,
March 12, 2008, pet. filed).
65. Dick's Last Resort, 273 S.W.3d at 910.
66. Id. at 909, 913.
67. Id. at 909.
68. Id. (emphasis added).




In support of its veil piercing claims, Market/Ross offered evidence
that Schiff deliberately intended to substitute a no-asset company as the
tenant under the lease in order to avoid liability being incurred by Dick's
Texas in the event of a future breach of the lease. 71 Interestingly, Schiff
admitted this fact and claimed that, had Market/Ross not agreed to the
substitution of what was effectively a shell company as the tenant, he
would not have entered into the ten-year extension of the lease in 1999.
Indeed, Schiff claimed that had the substitution of a Dick's West End as
tenant not been agreed to by Market/Ross, he would have moved the
restaurant to Addison in 1999, at the end of the then current lease term.
In other words, Schiff readily admitted that Dick's West End had no as-
sets, and that his purpose in having Dick's West End as the tenant was to
avoid exposing the assets of Dick's Texas to any liability for a breach of
that lease over the new ten-year term. The only dispute, then, was
whether Schiff's failure to disclose the financial condition of Dick's West
End, his "plan" to put in place a shell company to avoid future exposure
for Dick's Texas in the event of a breach of the lease, his alleged misrep-
resentation that Dick's West End was going to be the actual operator of
the restaurant,72 and his "avoidance" of the 1% provision, constituted
70. Id. at 909. Under common law fraud by misrepresentation (as opposed to nondis-
closure), a plaintiff must prove that: (1) a material misrepresentation was made; (2) the
representation was false; (3) when the representation was made the speaker knew it was
false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion;
(4) the speaker made the representation intending that the other party act upon it; (5) the
party acted in reliance on the representation; and (6) the party thereby suffered injury. See
Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47
(Tex. 1998); Cardinal Health Solons, Inc. v. Valley Baptist Med. Ctr., No. 1:07-CV-111,
2009 WL 150942, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2009). Common law fraud can also occur in
cases of non-disclosure, but the circumstances are very limited. See West & Bodamer,
supra note 1, at 1159; see also Cronus Offshore, Inc. v. Kerr McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 369
F. Supp. 2d 848, 858 (E.D. Tex. 2004). Dick's Last Resort is not the first case to suggest
that "actual fraud" for purposes of Article 2.21 is something less than the "actual fraud"
that would constitute a common law tort, and we are concerned that this low, vague stan-
dard of "actual fraud" means that Article 2.21 really offers no additional protection be-
yond the current requirements applicable to veil piercing claims generally when Article
2.21 is not applicable. See Country Village Homes, Inc. v. Patterson, 236 S.W.3d 413, 432
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.) (rejecting con-
tention that Article 2.21 requires submission of common law fraud as an independent
ground of recovery in a veil-piercing action based on alter ego).
71. Dick's Last Resort, 273 S.W.3d at 911.
72. Although a great deal has been raised by the landlord regarding the sublease of
the restaurant's operations to Dick's Texas, it may be much ado about nothing. Even ac-
cording to the landlord's own brief, had Dick's West End not subleased the premises and
operated the restaurant itself (as it allegedly represented), the primary asset of Dick's West
End would have only been the ongoing operating profits (if any) from the restaurant (it
would not have included the assets of Dick's Texas or Dick's Holding Company). See
Appellees' Brief at 3 n.8, Dick's Last Resort, 273 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 5,
2008). Thus, even if Dick's West End had not subleased the restaurant operations to
Dick's Texas, and had actually been the operator of the restaurant, the landlord still may
have gotten nothing in a breach of contract claim against Dick's West End once operations
ceased because Dick's West End could have made dividends of any operating profit to its
holding company parent throughout the lease term. Thus, it is not clear to the authors
that there was any actual damage to the landlord from the claimed fraud.
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"actual fraud" for the "direct personal benefit" of each of the entities
sought to be charged with liability.73 And, more specifically, the only rele-
vant issues on appeal were whether the jury had been properly instructed
on what was necessary to find an "actual fraud," and whether there was
sufficient evidence to support those findings.
While the court acknowledged that Article 2.21 was the exclusive basis
for any veil piercing claim involving a contractual obligation or related
matter, the subsequent analysis by the court seemingly disregarded Arti-
cle 2.21 in favor of the Castleberry decision it superseded and the Texas
Supreme Court's clarification of Castleberry in SSP Partners.74 As previ-
ously noted, SSP Partners involved an analysis of traditional veil piercing
claims where Article 2.21 was not otherwise directly applicable. Accord-
ingly, neither SSP Partners nor Castleberry should have been directly rel-
evant. Nevertheless, the court relied on both to determine that the
evidence supported the jury's conclusion that "Schiff, Dick's Texas, and
Dick's Holding Company [Appellants] caused Dick's West End to be
used for the purpose of perpetrating, and did perpetrate an actual fraud
on Market/Ross primarily for direct personal benefit, '75 as required by
Article 2.21:
Appellants planned to use the corporations to ensure the landlord
could not recover any assets in the event the tenant decided to va-
cate before the end of the lease term, and concealed the plan from
Market/Ross while committing to a ten-year lease term. They
evaded the contractual obligations to pay rent for the full term of the
lease and to make payment under the guaranty and the 1%
provision.76
While "actual fraud" can certainly arise from nondisclosure where a
duty to disclose exists, Texas law only imposes a duty to disclose in lim-
ited circumstances where: (i) there is a fiduciary relationship, (ii) a partial
disclosure of information has been voluntary made that is misleading (or
any earlier disclosure voluntarily made is now false), or (iii) the undis-
closed facts could not have been discovered by the other party "exercis-
ing ordinary care and diligence."'77 These limited circumstances were
ignored by the trial court and the court of appeals.
There was nothing in the facts described by the court to indicate that
the relationship between Market/Ross and any of the Dick's Holding
Company affiliates was anything other than arm's-length, nor was there
any suggestion by the court that Schiff made any disclosures of any kind
regarding Dick's West End's financial condition such that a duty would
have arisen to make that disclosure complete. And, it is hard to imagine
73. Dick's Last Resort, 273 S.W.3d at 911.
74. Id. at 910 ("These are the considerations both the legislature and the supreme
court have emphasized and required.").
75. Id. at 912.
76. Id. at 912-13.
77. See West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1159; see also Cronus Offshore, Inc. v. Kerr
McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 848, 858 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
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how even the most basic diligence or investigation of Dick's West End's
financial condition would have failed to uncover its lack of assets. More-
over, the mere failure to pay rent, pay the guaranty or honor the 1%
provision are breaches of contract, not an actual fraud.78 In this regard,
even the "evasion of existing obligations" is not "actual fraud;" rather it is
one of the laundry list of abuses that SSP Partners recognized as justifying
veil piercing when Article 2.21 is not applicable.
More importantly, a misrepresentation or nondisclosure is simply one
of the elements of an actual fraud. For example, to prove fraud by non-
disclosure, a claimant must show the following:
(1) a deliberate failure to disclose material facts, (2) by one who had
a duty to disclose such facts, (3) to another who was ignorant of the
facts and did not have an equal opportunity to discover them, (4)
with the intent the listener act or refrain from acting, and (5) the
listener relies on the nondisclosure resulting in injury.79
Thus, a party claiming fraud by omission or non-disclosure will not be
able to establish that claim if that party also had an opportunity to dis-
cover for themselves the undisclosed facts.80 Moreover, a party negotiat-
ing at arm's length may reasonably assume that the other party has made
his own investigation of the facts, drawn his own conclusions and negoti-
ated with the aim of protecting himself.81 Further, a mere failure to per-
form a contact is also not fraud and does not establish an intent not to
perform.8 2 And, even where an intent not to perform is established, it is
only established as a means to show that a false representation was made
at the time of contracting.8 3 The other elements of fraud must still be
proven, including the element of reliance on that false statement.8 4 In-
78. Of course, fraud can occur with the right facts where a party enters into a contract
while specifically representing that such party would perform certain specific obligations
under that contract, with no present intention of performing those obligations. See West &
Obi, supra note 1, at 896. But entering into a contract with an entity that may not be able
to answer for all of the counterparty's damages in the event of a breach is not the same as
intent not to perform the contract. Indeed, rent was paid on the lease in the case for
approximately six years of the ten year term. And, the failure to disclose the sublease (and
the fact that the rent would ultimately be coming from Dick's Texas) is not fraud unless
there was a duty to disclose; it is simply a breach of contract. And if there was no duty to
disclose the sublease, why would the failure to honor the one percent provision constitute
fraud?
79. Avery Pharm. Inv., Inc. v. Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., No. 2-07-317-CV, 2009 WL
279334, at *10 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 5, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also 7979
Airport Garage L.L.C. v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 488, 507 n.27 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754-55
(Tex. 2001).
80. See Bradford, 48 S.W.3d at 756.
81. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551, cmt k. (1977)).
82. Friedman v. Powerell Electrical, 456 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. 1970); Turner v. Biscoe,
171 S.W.2d 118, 118-19 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1943, judgm't adopted); Walker v. Comdata
Network Inc., 730 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd by agr.); Manziel
v. Williams, 262 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1953, no writ).
83. See 456 S.W.2d at 763; Turner, 171 S.W.2d at 118.
84. See Comdata, 730 S.W.2d at 772; Manziel, 262 S.W.2d at 439; see also Winkins v.
Frank Winther Invs., Inc., 881 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1994, no pet.)
("where the basis of a plaintiff's claim of fraud is a promise, the elements of actionable
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deed, regardless of whether an affirmative representation or an omission
is present, reliance is an element of any common law fraud claim, includ-
ing fraud by non-disclosure, conspiracy to defraud, fraudulent induce-
ment and misrepresentation.8 5 Paragraphs 7 and 13 of the lease
amendment should have been clearly relevant to the issue of reasonable
or justifiable reliance in this regard.
Important for purposes of Article 2.21, the court also did not analyze
or even discuss the requirement of a showing of "direct personal bene-
fit."'8 6 If an actual fraud was perpetrated on the landlord through the use
of Dick's West End, for whose direct personal benefit was that fraud per-
petrated? Dick's West End was allegedly used to perpetrate a fraud, the
purpose of which was to shield Dick's Texas from liability for the lease. If
that is the case, how does this make Dick's Holding Company or Schiff
liable under Article 2.21? Had Dick's West End never been substituted
as the tenant, Dick's Texas would have been the entity on the lease and
no liability would have been imposed on Schiff or Dick's Holding Com-
pany as a result. What was the direct personal benefit they received from
the use of Dick's West End? Thus, allowing a veil piercing claim to reach
these parties, even if there had been an actual fraud, allowed the landlord
to get a better outcome than the landlord would have obtained had none
of the claimed acts of fraud occurred.
The jury instructions described by the court, while referencing the re-
quirements of Article 2.21 generally, also reference traditional alter-ego,
sham to perpetuate a fraud and evasion of existing legal obligation ques-
tions.8 7 The wrongful acts required to establish these theories of liability
are irrelevant when Article 2.21 is applicable because the statute declares
that no piercing of the corporate veil may occur based on "alter ego,"
"actual or constructive fraud," a "sham to perpetrate a fraud," or any
other "similar theory," unless the corporation was used to perpetuate an
actual fraud for the direct personal benefit of the entity or individual
fraud are (1) a promise to perform in the future; (2) made without a present intent to
perform; (3) for the purpose of inducing a party to act; (4) in reliance upon which the party
does act; (5) and as a result of which, the party suffers damage") (citing Dowling v. NADW
Mktg. Inc., 631 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex. 1982)).
85. Avery Pharm. Inv. v. Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., No. 2-07-317-CV, 2009 WL
279334, at *10-12 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 5, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reviewing the
elements required for fraud by nondisclosure, conspiracy to defraud, and misrepresenta-
tion in Texas); Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795, 798-99 (Tex. 2001) (providing that "with a
fraudulent inducement claim, the elements of fraud must be established as they relate to an
agreement between the parties"); see also Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, v. Presidio Eng'rs
and Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47-48 (Tex. 1998).
86. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.21.A(2) (Vernon 2003). For an analysis of the
"personal benefit" requirement, see Bates v. DeTournillon, No. 07-03-0257, 2006 WL
265474, at *3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, Feb. 3, 2006, no pet.) (reversing the imposition of
personal liability on a shareholder because there was no evidence that the shareholder
removed property from leased premises for his own personal benefit, comparing to cases
finding "direct personal benefit" where a shareholder used money for home or family
purchases); see also West & Obi, supra note 1, at 895.
87. Dick's Last Resort, 273 S.W.3d at 910.
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sought to be charged.88
There may well have been an "actual fraud" justifying the imposition of
liability as proscribed by Article 2.21 in this case; we certainly do not
know.89 But the court should have required the jury to actually find all of
the required elements of an actual common law fraud before imposing
that liability. And, equally importantly, there should have been a finding
of "direct personal benefit" as a result of that actual fraud with respect to
each person or entity sought to be charged with liability under Article
2.21.
It is "one of the principal objectives of the formation of corpora-
tions ... to isolate liabilities among separate entities." 90 As between so-
phisticated parties, a party should be bound by the agreements that it
makes with a separate corporate entity.91 Paragraphs 7 and 13 of the
lease amendment Market/Ross should thus have been relevant to the is-
sue of whether there was 'reasonable reliance" by the landlord on any
misrepresentation, nondisclosure or purported promise.92 Moreover, a
counterparty to a contract should not be permitted to come back, after
the fact, and seek relief from non-contracting, but affiliated, entities
through veil-piercing claims based on facts that may not have otherwise
supported a direct claim for actual fraud against those parties, at least
where Article 2.21 applies. In disregarding these bedrock rules of Texas
corporate law, the Dallas Court of Appeals clearly erred.
88. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 2.21.A (Vernon 2003).
89. Indeed, the authors are troubled by much of the alleged conduct of the tenant
from an ethical and moral perspective, at least based on the way that conduct was charac-
terized by the court. But, we should be cautious in equating potentially unethical business
practices with "actual fraud," least we allow "bad facts" to "make bad law." Moreover,
the authors are equally troubled by the conduct of the landlord in avoiding the landlord's
own contractual undertakings, that there were no oral representations outside the lease
amendment, and that it would look solely to Dick's West End for redress.
90. Mims v. Brunswick Homes, LLC (In re Moore), 379 B.R. 284, 289 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2007).
91. See Wood Motor Co. v. Nebel, 238 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1951); see also Glenn D.
West & Emmanuel U. Obi, Avoiding Fraud and Other Extra-Contractual Claims: There
May be More to the Deal than the Contract-2007, 2007 MERGERS & AcQuISITIONS INST.
at 4 (Oct. 4, 2007); Glenn D. West & Benton B. Bodamer, Avoiding Fraud and Other
Extra-Contractual Claims: There May be More to the Deal than the Contract, 2006 MERG-
ERS AND ACQUISITIONS INST. at 3 (Sept. 7-8, 2006); see generally Glenn D. West, Avoiding
Extra-Contractual Fraud Claims in Portfolio Company Sales Transactions - Is "Walk-
Away" Deal Certainty Achievable for the Seller?, PRIVATE EQuiTY ALERT (Weil, Gotshal
& Manges, LLP, New York, N.Y.) March 2006, at 1, available at http://www.weil.comlwgm/
cwgmhomep.nsf/Files/PEAMar06/$file/PEAMarO6.pdf.
92. There is a difference between a merger clause and a nonreliance provision. See
West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 763; A.G. Nichols v. YJ USA Corp., No 3:06-CV-02366-L,
2009 WL 722997, at *21 (N.D. Tex. 2009). But, Paragraph 13 is clearly more than a mere
merger clause; and it states categorically that were no representations made outside of the
agreement. When coupled with Paragraph 7 of the lease agreement (which specifically
limited landlord's right to recover under the lease from anyone other than Dick's West
End), it is difficult to imagine how there was reasonable reliance on any representation
outside the agreement. And, reasonable reliance is a required element of any fraud.
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III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRACTUAL
DISCLAIMERS-HELPFUL CLARIFICATION FROM
THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
Breach of contract claims are frequently accompanied by tort claims
such as fraud or misrepresentation. 93 By adding these claims, a tort
claimant may seek to avoid the contractually agreed limitations on its
remedies set forth in the contract, as well seek to rely upon extra-contrac-
tual representations not stated in the contract.94 Moreover, tort-based
claims have the advantage of allowing claimants to seek recovery from
the individual officers and the entity affiliates of the contracting corpo-
rate party who participated in the allegedly tortious behavior, without the
necessity of piercing the corporate veil.95 To avoid these claims, con-
tracting parties often insert non-reliance provisions in their contract. In
Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Swanson, the Texas Supreme
Court endorsed these provisions, when agreed to among sophisticated
parties represented by counsel, holding that "a release that clearly ex-
presses the parties' intent to waive fraudulent inducement claims, or one
that disclaims reliance on representations about specific matters in dis-
pute, can preclude a claim of fraudulent inducement. ' '96 As a result of
Schlumberger and its progeny, "Texas was once considered firmly in the
group of states that allowed sophisticated parties to contractually disclaim
reliance on extra-contractual representations" and thus negate fraud and
misrepresentation claims as a matter of law. 97 Nevertheless, in our 2007
and 2008 Survey articles, we noted the inconsistent application of the
Schlumberger decision in Texas intermediate appellate courts. 98 The pri-
mary area where lower courts differed involved the scope of the Schlum-
berger holding. More specifically, some Texas courts were applying the
Schlumberger decision only to settlement agreements, while other Texas
courts were applying the Schlumberger decision to all contracts
generally.99
93. West & Obi, supra note 1, at 895; West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1157; West &
Stasny, supra note 1, at 721.
94. See West & Obi, supra note 1, at 896; see also Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268
S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. 2008).
95. See West, supra note 1, at 1226-30 (2001); West & Treadway, supra note 1, at 811-
16; West & Chao, supra note 1, at 1403-08; West & Stasny, supra note 1, at 726-27; West &
Nelson, supra note 1, at 804-09.
96. 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997).
97. West & Obi, supra note 91, at 4.
98. See West & Obi, supra note 1, 895-906; West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 758.
99. Compare Steinberg v. Brennan, No. 3:03-CV-0562, 2005 WL 1837961, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. July 29, 2005) (applying Texas law) (holding that the "idiosyncratic drafting and other
characteristic facts of Schlumberger are not prerequisite for a finding of clear and unequiv-
ocal intent" to disclaim reliance on extra-contractual representations) with Warehouse As-
socs. Corp. Centre II v. Celotex Corp., 192 S.W.3d 225, 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (narrowly interpreting Schlumberger to hold that avoidance of
fraud claims via non-reliance clause is only possible when the clause is part of a settlement
of a long-standing dispute between the parties, and is specifically tailored to specifically
disclaimed representations.). See West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 763 (noting a trend of
Texas courts to apply Schlumberger narrowly); West & Obi, supra note 1, at 897-906 (sur-
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Consistent with our interpretation of the broad application of Schlum-
berger, and just one month prior to the Texas Supreme Court's Forest Oil
decision, the Eastland Court of Appeals applied the Schlumberger deci-
sion broadly and, in Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Italian
Cowboy Partners,10 determined that disclaimer of reliance and merger
clauses successfully negated the element of reliance in a contract for the
lease of a restaurant property. The court found that when a successful
restaurateur contracted for the lease of restaurant property while being
represented by counsel and a real-estate agent in an arm's length transac-
tion, he disclaimed reliance on any and all extra-contractual representa-
tions. 101 The court correctly emphasized that:
[w]hen sophisticated business parties who have fully negotiated a
contract and who have been represented by attorneys or other pro-
fessionals in the field are dealing at arm's length, they should be able
to enter a contract in which they effectively disclaim reliance, or in
which they agree that there are no representations outside of the
written contract, or in which they otherwise provide for merger.
10 2
This rule promotes clarity and deal certainty-something we have called
for the Texas Supreme Court to reaffirm for many years.10
3
Finally, during this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court resolved
the conflicts among the lower courts as to the breadth of Schlumberger in
Forest Oil Corporation v. McAllen. 104 Forest Oil involved a settlement
agreement entered into in 1999 between Forest Oil Corporation ("Forest
Oil") and James McAllen ("McAllen") regarding disputed oil and gas
royalties and leasehold development rights."' 5 The settlement agreement
was diligently negotiated through mediation and released all claims of
any kind relating to the leaseholds, but reserved the right to arbitrate any
"claims for environmental liability, surface damages, personal injury, or
wrongful death" related to the leaseholds.10 6 The agreement contained a
disclaimer of reliance upon any statements or misrepresentations not con-
tained in the settlement agreement, as well as an acknowledgment by
each party that they were fully advised by counsel prior to executing the
agreement. 10 7 Then, in 2004, McAllen sued Forest Oil claiming that For-
est Oil "used its access under the leases to the surface estate to bury
highly toxic [materials]" and sought to recover for environmental dam-
veying Texas decisions that applied Schlumberger narrowly and those applying Schlum-
berger broadly).
100. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Italian Cowboy Partners, 270 S.W.3d 192 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2008, pet. filed).
101. Id. at 200.
102. Id.
103. See West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 757; West & Obi, supra note 1, at 896; West &
Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1156; West & Nelson, supra note 1, at 812; West & Chao, supra
note 1, at 1415.
104. Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. 2008).
105. Id. at 53.
106. Id. at 53-54.
107. Id. at 54.
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age.10 8 By the terms of the settlement agreement, these kinds of disputes
were to be arbitrated rather than litigated, and Forest Oil moved to com-
pel arbitration. 10 9 McAllen responded by claiming that he was fraudu-
lently induced to enter into the arbitration provision.110 The trial court
denied Forest Oil's motion to compel, and the court of appeals affirmed,
but treated the issue as merely evidentiary. However, the Texas Supreme
Court stated that "this case fundamentally poses a legal question, not a
factual one: does McAllen's disclaimer of reliance on Forest Oil's repre-
sentations negate the fraudulent-inducement claim as a matter of law?"
In reversing the court of appeals decision, the supreme court held, as a
matter of law, that the disclaimer of reliance provision set forth in the
contested settlement agreement "conclusively defeats McAllen's fraudu-
lent inducement claim." '
McAllen argued that the supreme court decision in Schlumberger was
not applicable to this case citing "material fact differences. 1 12 The pri-
mary argument was that in Schlumberger, the parties were back in court
regarding the very subject matter of the underlying settlement agree-
ment. Accordingly, unlike the facts in Schlumberger, the contested settle-
ment agreement in Forest Oil pertained to "royalty underpayment and
mineral underdevelopment," whereas the current dispute related to "en-
vironmental and personal-injury torts.""13 Thus, McAllen argued, Forest
Oil's alleged "misrepresentation here did not concern known disputed
matters (which were settled and released) but potential future disputes
(which were set aside and reserved)[;]" [a]nd the disclaimer applie[d]
solely to representations about the former and not the latter."'1 4 The
supreme court was not convinced by this argument and stated:
Our analysis in Schlumberger rested on the paramount principle that
Texas courts should uphold contracts negotiated at arm's length by
'knowledgeable and sophisticated business players' represented by
'highly competent and able legal counsel,' a principle that applies
with equal force to contracts that reserve future claims as to con-
tracts that settle all claims.115
As noted above, many lower courts were confused by Schlumberger's ap-
parently limited holding, but the Forest Oil case clarifies and expands on
the facts of the Schlumberger holding, clearly reinforcing the sanctity of
contract and the ability of sophisticated parties to rely on the contract
terms that they negotiate. Additionally, although the statement was not
necessary to the holding of the case, the supreme court indicated its will-
ingness to further expand the holding in the future when it stated, "The
108. Id.
109, Id.
110. Id. at 55.
111. Id. at 56.
112. Id. at 57.
113, Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 58.
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reasoning of the case applies broadly to contracts generally .... "116 This
statement is indicative of the court's willingness to apply the Schlum-
berger holding not only to settlement agreements, as some courts have
proposed,1 7 but to all contracts between knowledgeable parties repre-
sented by counsel as we have long championed.11 8
It is important to note, however, that Forest Oil did not "adopt a per se
rule that a disclaimer automatically precludes a fraudulent-inducement
claim;" rather the court confirmed that a disclaimer of reliance provision
will, as a matter of law, defeat a fraudulent inducement claim if the provi-
sion evidences "'the requisite clear and unequivocal expression of intent
necessary to disclaim reliance' on the specific representations at issue."1 19
In determining whether a particular disclaimer of reliance meets that
standard, the court is required to look at each contract and "the totality
of the surrounding circumstances[.] ' 12 0 The most relevant factors in find-
ing that a particular disclaimer is binding are:
(1) the terms of the contract were negotiated, rather than boiler-
plate, and during negotiations the parties specifically discussed the
issue which has become the topic of the subsequent dispute; (2) the
complaining party was represented by counsel; (3) the parties dealt
with each other in an arm's length transaction; (4) the parties were
knowledgeable in business matters; and (5) the release language was
clear.' 21
But, if the contract and "surrounding circumstances" thus evidence a
"clear and unequivocal expression of intent necessary to disclaim reli-
ance," the court will enforce such a disclaimer as a matter of law. To do
otherwise would "invite unfortunate consequences for everyday business
transactions and the efficient settlement of disputes.' 22 Indeed, accord-
ing to the supreme court:
After-the-fact protests of misrepresentation are easily lodged, and
parties who contractually promise not to rely on extra-contractual
statements-more than that, promise that they have in fact not relied
upon such statements-should be held to their word. Parties should
not sign contracts while crossing their fingers behind their backs ....
It is not asking too much that parties not rely on extra-contractual
statements that they contract not to rely on (or else set forth the
relied-upon representations in the contract or except them from the
disclaimer). If disclaimers of reliance cannot ensure finality and pre-
clude post-deal claims for fraudulent inducement, then freedom of
contract, even among the most knowledgeable parties advised by the
116. Id. at 58 n.25 (emphasis added).
117. See Nustrasep, LLC v. TOPC Texas, LLC, No. A-05-CA-523 LY, 2006 WL
3063432, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2006); In re Heritage, 375 B.R. 230, 265 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2007).
118. See West & Lewis, supra note 1, at 760; West & Obi, supra note 1, at 897.






most knowledgeable legal counsel, is grievously impaired. 123
This is indeed welcome clarification of the Texas courts commitment to
sanctity of contract between sophisticated parties.
IV. CONCLUSION
The seminal cases decided during this Survey period renew our hope
that Texas courts are moving back toward an age of contractual certainty
in corporate negotiations. We are pleased that the Texas Supreme Court
expressly disavowed the single business enterprise doctrine of corporate
veil piercing in SSP v. Gladstrong. We are equally encouraged by the
clarity provided by the court in Forest Oil on the proper, broad interpre-
tation of the Schlumberger holding that will allow sophisticated con-
tracting parties to agree to waive reliance on extra-contractual
representations. While we were troubled by the Dick's Last Resort deci-
sion, we are hopeful that it does not become precedent for an under-
standing of the "actual fraud" requirement of Article 2.21 that effectively
equates that requirement to the traditional veil piercing analysis of Cas-
tleberry and its progeny, or a means of end-running the effective use of
disclaimers to avoid claims of "actual fraud" based on extra-contractual
representations.
123. Id. at 60-61.
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